date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 The Emerging Rapprochement between Cognitive and Ecological Analyses 1 Introduction "The functional approach [Brunswik's] has its place mainly in the appraisal of the interplay and relative contribution or weight of factors in the adjustment to a given ecology, while the reductive approach [Experimental Psychology's] reveals the technological details of the machinery that brings about such adjustment" (Brunswik, 2001 (Brunswik, /1955 .
"Now if an organism is confronted with the problem of behaving approximately rationally, or adaptively, in a particular environment, the kinds of simplifications that are suitable may depend not only on the characteristics -sensory, neural, and other -of the organism, but equally upon the structure of the environment. Hence, we might hope to discover, by a careful examination of some of the fundamental structural characteristics of the environment, some further clues as to the nature of the approximating mechanisms used in decision making." (Simon, 1956, p. 129-130) As revealed by the above quotes, nearly 50 years ago Brunswik and Simon agreed on the necessity of understanding the environment to understand cognition. They also agreed that the cost and benefit of environmental cues was an important piece of the ecological-cognitive puzzle. For example, in discussing the relationship between the ecological validity of a cue and its utilization, Brunswik (2001 Brunswik ( /1955 pointed out that, "Ideally, cues should be utilized in accordance with their validity. But here we must inject . . . the element of 'cost' to the organism, just as we must ask for the cost of an automobile along with its efficiency in budgeting our expenditures. Functional theory here takes on certain features of economic theory" (p. 147). In date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 turn, Simon (1956) , in amassing the arguments against classical economics that eventually led to his Nobel Prize (Leahey, 2003) , complained that the models of rational behavior employed in economics postulated, "a much greater complexity in the choice mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in the organism for obtaining information and performing computations" than was supported by the psychology of that day. Stating his problem as one of "behaving approximately rationally, or adaptively, in a particular environment" he went on to explore the "fundamental structural characteristics of the environment" to show that "we should be skeptical in postulating for humans, or other organisms, elaborate mechanisms for choosing among diverse needs" (p.
137).
Given the common emphasis on the environment and common skepticism regarding the need to postulate complex cognitive processes, someone who was new to cognitive science might be forgiven for thinking that, in the last 50-yrs, the intellectual descendants of Brunswik and Simon have merged into one happy family. Although this has not happened yet, it is happening now.
Keys to the Emerging Rapprochement
Fifty years ago, neither side of what Brunswik termed the "functional" versus "reductive" approach had a coherent story as to how the mechanisms of cognition meshed with the external environment to form integrated cognitive systems. Since then, major advances have been made in understanding the interplay between the internal psychological activities that Brunswik dismissed as mere "process detail" and the environment. Some of these advances have led to the realization that we do not store the mental equivalent of a 360°, high-definition, visual display of the world with "surround sound" in our heads, but rather we construct what we need when we need it. Although this construct may feel seamless to the perceiver it is, in fact, patchy and partial (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1998) . date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 In this section I introduce three of these advances, embodied cognition (Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Wilson, 2002) architectures of cognition (Newell, 1990) , and soft constraints . In the following section, I turn to research from the CogWorks Laboratory at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute that illustrates how these three advances yield an understanding of the functional task environment that is the key to the rapprochement between cognitive and ecological analyses.
Embodied Cognition
There are many senses of the term, embodied cognition (Clark, in press; Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Wilson, 2002) ; however, simply put, embodied cognition implies that properties of functional cognition and of the perceived world are in a tight loop. Properties of our cognitive, perceptual, and action systems determine how much and what aspects of the world we perceive; whereas properties of the world determine the mixture of cognitive, perceptual, and action operations required for us to perceive it. Another way of saying this is that, "The embodied view is that the environment and perceiver should not be separated but should be viewed as an integrated system" (Ballard, 2002, p. 56) .
Embodied cognition has profound implications for how we view what it means to have an "ecological analysis". Surely, if we and the world form an "integrated system", then an ecological analyses of our task environment cannot be separated from an analysis of functional cognition. By themselves, both ecological and cognitive analyses are incomplete. Advances in understanding one, requires understanding how it is integrated with the other. Rapprochement is not simply an interesting new direction, it is vital for the continuing progress of our science.
We can get by with a patchy and partial mental representation of the world because we are able to perform "just-in-time" processing. This view implies that we must be as unaware of the date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 construction processes (under normal circumstances) as we are with the patchy and partial nature of what they construct. Indeed, pundits as diverse as Neil Cassidy (T. Wolfe, 1968) , John R. Anderson (1987) , and Dana Ballard (Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995; Ballard et al., 1997) have proposed that there is a 1/3 to 1 sec delay in our awareness of the world. We are aware of the end product of the processes that fill this gap, but not the processes themselves. Ballard has labeled the mixture of cognitive, perceptual, and action operations that mediate between the world and our awareness of it the embodiment level.
Architectures of Cognition
Verbal descriptions of theoretical processes cannot suffice to capture the rapid and nondeliberate control of operations at the embodiment level. Serious theorizing demands the adoption of a suitable architecture of cognition.
Architectures of cognition (Newell, 1973 (Newell, , 1990 (Newell, , 1992 focus on the control of a central system. Issues of control for the central system include control of the central processor itself as well as the initiation of functional processes (such as visual search, action, and memory retrieval) and the harvesting of the results of those processes. Such control by the central system is conceptually distinct from the internal control required by individual functional processes. For example, the central controller may initiate a visual search for a given target but, once initiated, visual search (e.g., where to move the eyes next) is under the local control of the functional process. Hence, architectures incorporate two types of theories: type 1 theory denotes central control, whereas type 2 theories deal with control of the various functional processes. Type 1 provides a theory of central control that determines how the processing performed by the various functional processes are interleaved to produce an integrated cognitive system. Type 2 consists date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 of theories of the internal control of functional processes as well as how and what they communicate to the controller.
Some of the work presented below includes models written in ACT-R 5.0 (Anderson et al., in press ). An understanding of ACT-R 5.0 is not required to understand our presentation; however, we chose ACT-R as it is an open architecture that incorporates type 1 and type 2 theories. For type 2, ACT-R 5.0 includes functional processes such as an activation-based memory, current focus of attention (often thought of as the current goal), movement of visual attention, a theory of eye movements (Salvucci, 2001) , the Treisman theory of feature detection (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Sato, 1990) , and the theory of motor movements used by EPIC (Kieras, Meyer, Ballas, & Lauber, 2000) . The operation of these type 2 processes is viewed as largely subsymbolic.
Type 1, central control, is provided by three elements: production rules, functions that specify and initiate type 2 processes, and process-specific buffers that can cache the result of type 2 processes. A production rule is a symbolic component in the form of a condition-action pair. On each cycle any production rule whose condition side matches the current state of the system is eligible to fire. The matching process is massively parallel; however, only one production rule can fire on any given cycle. If the conditions for more than one production rule match, then the choice among production rules is based on a subsymbolic calculation of each rule's expected utility. After being selected, the action side of the condition-action pair is executed. The action side may initiate a type 2 process. Complementarily, the results of type 2 processes are cached in process-specific buffers. The contents of these buffers can be harvested or accessed by the condition side of production rules. date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46
Soft Constraints in Interactive Behavior
The Soft Constraints approach builds on the notions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1956 (Simon, , 1992 and rational analysis (Anderson, 1990 (Anderson, , 1991 to apply the rational, expected utility framework to selecting the elementary activities that occur at the embodiment level. It embraces methodological adaptationism (Godfrey-Smith, 2001 ) in that it assumes that interactive behavior at the < 1000 msec timescale reflects an adaptation to the task environment. It does not, however, postulate that behavior reflects an optimal adaptation (Fu & Gray, 2004a ).
For any given task environment, we can define a set of elementary activities (Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000) for interactive behavior. For example, moving a mouse on the computer screen to a given interactive object consists of a network of cognitive, perceptual, and action operators such as shown in Figure 1 . This network defines the elementary activity of movecursor. The set of elementary activities available in a given task environment is defined by the variety of ways in which the tools available to the agent can interact with the objects in the task environment. At their most basic, the tools available to an agent include hands and arms, eyes and ears, memory and attention. Tools may also include mouse and keyboard, hammer and nails, stethoscope and thermometer, mathematics and language.
As defined by Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000) , elementary activities have properties similar to Ullman's (1984) visual routines; namely, they are computational primitives that can be composed (Ballard, 2002) into higher order units. In our case, activities are composed into microstrategies that accomplish a unit of meaningful activity.
As a type of control, soft constraints are positioned between bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or strategic) control of behavior. For example, take the case of searching a visual date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 display for a target "L" hidden among distractor "T's". To make the search task slightly easier, although the target L is always surrounded by distractor T's, it is always located in the center of one of four quadrants (see Figure 2 ) of the visual display ).
In performing this task people may deliberately adopt the top-down strategy of always starting their search at the upper-left quadrant and moving clockwise until the target is found.
Alternatively, if one of the quadrants contains a denser configuration of distracters than the other quadrants, bottom-up or stimulus-driven factors may attract the eye so that the dense quadrant is the one that is initially searched. This stimulus-driven capture effect may occur even though the dense quadrant is no more likely than the other quadrants to contain the target (see, J. M. Wolfe, 1998 , for a discussion of stimulus-driven factors that influence visual search). Finally, if the dense quadrant never contains the target, the subject may adapt to the task environment by searching the dense quadrant less frequently than would be expected by chance. This last case is an example of adaptation to the expected utility of a particular task environment and, as such, reflects the operation of soft constraints. (Whether people are aware of soft constraints and whether they apply them deliberately or not deliberately is not essential to our definition.)
Although specifying the task environment appears, in principle, to be both objective and deterministic, the soft constraints approach implies that the functional task environment for a given activity always reflects a mixture of internal and external resources. For example, to obtain information it may be possible to move eyes and attention to a location on a computer screen; alternatively, the same information may be retrieved from memory. In such situations, the sets of elementary activities with the highest expected utility may not be defined simply by reference to the physical task environment, but must incorporate the agent as well. Hence, despite the presence of perfect knowledge in-the-world, soft constraints may lead the agent to rely on date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 imperfect knowledge in-the-head . In this example, the imperfect knowledge in-the-head becomes part of the functional task environment. (The supposition that the cognitive controller is indifferent to the source of resources is congruent with many contemporary accounts of cognition (for example, Anderson et al., 2004; Carlson, 2002; Clark, 2004) and obtains support from the study discussed below.) Soft constraints represent an adaptation to the cost-benefit structure of the task environment.
The adaptation to costs may proceed at a different rate than the adaptation to benefit (Fu & Gray, 2004b) . The adaptation may reflect experience in past task environments as well as in the current task environment. It is important to emphasize that stable adaptations may not be optimal adaptations. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that many adaptations result in stable, suboptimal performance (Fu & Gray, 2004a , 2004b Herrnstein, 1991; Yechiam, Erev, Yehene, & Gopher, 2003) .
Defining the Functional Task Environment
The functional task environment emerges from the interaction of embodied cognition performing a given task in a given physical task environment. The functional task environment includes both less and more than the physical task environment. The physical task environment may well be a 360°, high-definition, visual display with surround sound. However, the functional task environment is not; it is partial and patchy.
The patches to the functional task environment are provided by various levels of cognitive control including bottom-up, top-down, and soft constraints. The work presented in this section emphasizes the role of soft constraints. I present three lines of research, each of which bears on the topic of the functional task environment, each of which draws on theories of embodied cognition, soft constraints, and the ACT-R architecture of cognition. 
Soft Constraints in the Adoption of Interaction-Intensive versus Memory-Intensive Strategies
Hard constraints derive from the physical task environment to limit the variety of activities that are available to perform a task. Soft constraints define the functional task environment and determine the set(s) of elementary activities that are most likely to be used. Despite the fact that human behavior is variable and, in many circumstances, hard to predict, time and again we see people settling on one or a very few ways of accomplishing the same task. For example, in an empirical study (Gray, 2000) , out of 9 subjects who discovered how to program a simulated VCR, seven adopted the same procedural rule hierarchy and two adopted minor variants. In the work discussed here by , of the 80 subjects shown a depiction of that procedural rule hierarchy as the experimenter programmed the first show, all used it to program the next four shows. Although extreme variation was possible, little variation was found.
Working within the hard constraints explicitly designed into the artifact, soft constraints determined how people attempted to use the VCR.
Soft constraints imply that the combination of resources brought to bear in performing a task is not fixed by either the physical task environment or the cognitive system, but emerges from the interaction of the two. In this section, we review two studies that explore the influence of the design of the task environment on how sub-processes required for task performance are composed.
Dynamic Decision Making
The landmark studies of Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) showed that strategy selection in decision-making trades off effectiveness for efficiency. For example, people are willing to adopt date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 strategies that are, say, 85% as effective as the optimal strategies if they incur, say, 40% of the costs in terms of time to execute. Three limits to this classic work are discussed in Gray, Schoelles, and Myers (2004) . Here we focus on one of those limits -confounding of the costs of steps in the decision-making algorithm with the costs of steps in a given task environment, and its corollary assumption that time is the only cost worth considering.
The data discussed here were obtained by embedding a decision-making task (DMT) in a dynamic classification task that required subjects to rate the threat value of air targets on a radar display. Over the course of a 12-min scenario a good subject would classify approximately 70-85 targets using the algorithm that we taught them for combining information. (We discuss the classification task in more detail later in this paper.) For the DMT we interrupted the classification task and presented subjects with a set of 4 (DMT-4) or 6 (DMT-6) already classified targets and asked them to pick the one with the highest threat value.
In two between-subject conditions, to obtain the threat value subjects had to locate the target's identification number (id#) on the radar screen and move the cursor to the number. In the 0-Lock condition, as soon as the cursor was above the id# the target's threat value would appear in a "tool-tip" windoid. In the 2-lock condition, the threat value appeared after a lockout period of 2-sec. A research question of interest was how this slight increase in cost would affect the process of information acquisition.
The results showed that the more targets in a decision-making set, the lower the percentage of threat values that were checked. For DMT-4, subjects checked approximately 72% of the targets compared to 62% of the DMT-6 targets. There were no significant differences between the 0-Lock and 2-lock conditions on the number of targets checked. date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 A very different story was told by the data on the number of targets that were rechecked. As Figure 3 shows, for the 0-Lock condition over 50% of the checked alternatives were rechecked.
In contrast, the 2-Lock group rechecked less than 7% of the checked alternatives. Relying on interaction-intensive strategies, the 0-Lock group was willing to recheck the targets before making their decision; presumably comparing a recently checked threat value with an earlier one.
In contrast, during their initial check, the 2-Lock group spends about twice as long per target (even when the 2-sec lockout time is subtracted) and apparently uses memory-intensive strategies that entail mentally encoding and comparing the current target's threat value with the highest-so-far threat value.
For this chapter, there are three take-away points from this research. First, a small difference in the cost structure between two otherwise physically identical task environments resulted in subjects adopting either an interactive-intensive or memory-intensive strategy for determining the alternative with the highest threat value. Second, as the small error bars in Figure 3 suggest, although there were no hard constraints forcing subjects in the two conditions to adopt two different approaches to this task, soft constraints operated to channel interactive behavior within each condition into common paths of greatest expected utility. Third, although the difference between the two physical task environments is small, the difference between the functional task environments is great. Compared to 2-lock, the 0-Lock functional task environment incorporates many more perceptual and motor operations. Compared to 0-Lock, the 2-Lock functional task environment incorporates a large memory annex for storage and retrieval of threat values. These differences between the functional task environments emerge from the interaction of embodied cognition attempting to accomplish a given task in a given physical task environment. date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46
Ignoring Perfect Knowledge In-The-World for Imperfect Knowledge In-The-Head
In a recent paper, studied the use of alternative basic activities to obtain information required to do a simple task -program a VCR. In that study, subjects were presented with a VCR simulation on the computer screen with an information window displayed approximately 5 inches below (see Figure 4) . The window contained the information required to program the current show: start time, end time, day-of-week, and channel.
Across three different conditions, the cost of acquiring information was varied to mimic the costs of acquiring information during routine interactions with a modern computer interface. For example, in the Free-Access condition the information was clearly visible on the screen. The costs here mimic the case of working in one window but needing to obtain information in another visible window. In the Gray-Box condition the information fields were covered by gray boxes. To obtain information from these fields subjects had to move their mouse and visual attention to the gray box (field names, such as "start time" were clearly visible) and click. This condition mimics the case where the information needed is on the screen, but its window is obscured by another window. In this case, the user needs to move to and click on a portion of the window to bring it to the foreground. The third condition was Memory-Test. In this condition, the display was similar to that seen by the Gray-Box subjects. The main difference was that subjects had to memorize the show information before they were allowed to begin programming the VCR. This condition mimics the case where the information is in an obscured window, but it is information that is well-learned.
In each of the three conditions, to obtain the information needed to program the VCR, subjects could either acquire information from the show information window or retrieve the information from memory. Based on estimates of times for perceptual-motor versus memory date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 retrieval in each condition (see Table 1 ), the Soft Constraints perspective predicted that subjects in the Memory-Test condition would rely on strong memories in-the-head rather than retrieving information in-the-world. In the Gray-Box condition the estimated time to retrieve weak memories was competitive with the time required to move the mouse and attention to the show information window. Hence, at least sometimes when information was needed, subjects would rely on imperfect knowledge in-the-head rather than perfect knowledge in-the-world. In the FreeAccess condition, the low cost of information access should lead subjects to rely on knowledge in-the-world. However, here too, soft constraints were expected to lead subjects to rely to some degree on imperfect knowledge in-the-head.
In line with these predictions, two independent measures of error showed that the MemoryTest group was best, followed by Free-Access, followed by Gray-Box. A third independent measure examined the timing of information accesses. For both the Gray-Box and Free-Access condition, if subjects accessed information in-the-world they tended to access it right before they needed it. For example, they would access the day-of-week field right before they programmed day-of-week. Subjects almost never interrupted their programming of, for example, day of week to check the day-of-week field. Similarly, they almost never double-checked a field after they had finished programming a setting. (In line with our expectations, the Memory-Test condition rarely accessed the show information window.)
The data suggest that the Free-Access and Gray-Box subjects used a mix of interactionintensive versus memory-intensive strategies. We do not believe that this mix reflects an extended deliberation on the part of the subject to use one strategy or the other. Rather, we believe the mix reflects a horse race between two readily available strategies. On a case-by-case date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 bases, subjects tended to rely on the process (retrieval of knowledge in-the-head versus in-theworld) that completed first.
The study supports the Soft Constraints perspective that milliseconds matter (Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000) . The functional task environment includes information in memory just as it includes information in the show information window. With all else equal (see Fu & Gray, 2004a , for a discussion of factors other than time cost that may affect the expected utility of a basic activity), the cognitive system favored the basic activities that required the least-effort in the functional task environment. The study also shows that the central controller is indifferent to the source of resources (in-the-head versus in-the-world) by showing that source selection is sensitive to least-effort costs of information acquisition. Finally, the data argue against Ballard's suggestion (1997) that people are willing to incur higher perceptual-motor costs to avoid lower memory costs.
Probing the Paradox of the Active User: Asymmetric Transfer May Produce Stable

Suboptimal Performance
The "paradox of the active user" (Carroll & Rosson, 1987) is the persistent use of inefficient procedures in interactive environments by experienced or even expert users when demonstrably more efficient procedures exist. The paradox is an instance of stable, suboptimal performance (Fu & Gray, 2004a) . This stability contrasts with the least-effort explanations adopted to explain the results discussed in section 3.1. However, people do not exclusively use one tool or one piece of software. Rather, we work in multiple task environments and our functional task environment seems cobbled together based on the statistical structure of these multiple environments. The two components of expected utility are an activity's cost and its history of success and failure.
History is balanced against cost. In this section we attempt to explore the balance by attempting date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 to create the paradox of the active user under laboratory conditions (see Fu & Gray, 2004a , for a more naturalistic approach).
Inducing the Paradox under Laboratory Conditions
In this work-in-progress (Gray, Veksler, & Fu, 2004) , we created two minor variations to the same physical task environment (VCR 3.0 shown in Figure 5 ) and trained different groups of subjects on each. One interface condition was nominally harder than the other. We examined two sets of issues. First, do subjects trained on the hard interface develop different procedures than those trained on the easy one? Second, when subjects transfer from the hard-to-easy or from the easy-to-hard interface do they keep the procedures they acquired during training, or do they acquire new procedures?
The physical task environment for this study was provided by the VCR 3.0 simulation. To program a setting (e.g., channel), the subject first clicked on its radio button (one of the 12 small buttons located in the lower half of the display) and then used the up/down arrows (towards the upper right of the figure) to reach the target value. As shown in Figure 5 , to set the start time the subjects must set start-hour, start-10min, and start-min. To set the end time, they must set endhour, end-10min, and end-min. In the interface used here the three radio buttons to set start time are in one row and the three buttons to set end time are in another row.
Two variations of the interface were created that varied the ease of selecting a radio button.
For the hard condition (shown in Figure 5 ), subjects had to select a column button before they could choose a radio button. There were no column buttons in the easy condition; subjects could select any radio button at any time.
The difference between our easy and hard conditions did not strike us as particularly great.
However, they were chosen to be representative of the differences in costs typically found in date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 commercially produced interfaces. The first research question of interest was whether these small differences would suffice to induce subjects to adopt different procedures for programming the VCR.
Strategies Adopted Across the First Four Shows
We hypothesized that due to the role of prior knowledge, subjects in the easy condition would adopt the by-row strategy. Specifically, once they began programming, say, start time they would complete it by programming start-hour, start-10min, and start-min (not necessarily in order) and would not interrupt themselves to program the day of week, channel, or any part of end time. The same prediction applies to programming all three parts of end time. In contrast, the hard condition increases the perceptual-motor cost of this knowledge-based strategy by requiring subjects to click column buttons on and off each time they wish to select a button in another column. Consequently, the hard interface would seem to encourage a by-column strategy that minimizes the cost of perceptual-motor activity; namely, setting parts of the start and end time in pairs (for example, start-and end-hour, start-and end-10min, and start-and end-min).
Each subject programmed 8 shows to the criterion of two consecutive trials of correctly programmed shows. Half of the subjects (32) programmed the first four shows with the hard interface and half with easy interface. For the last four shows they switched interface conditions. The dependent variable in this study was the strategy used by subjects to program start time and end time; either by-row or by-column.
For each show that each subject programmed, we derived a measure of strategy use based on the sequence in which radio buttons were selected. A positive score indicated a predominately by-row strategy and a negative score indicated a predominately by-column strategy. with the environment changed the way that subjects programmed the VCR from a strategy that was congruent with prior knowledge (programming all of start-time and all of end-time) to a strategy that in some way ran contrary to prior knowledge. Congruent with the least-effort expectations of the Soft Constraints approach, these findings show that small changes in the cost of cognitive, perceptual, and action operations result in major changes in how the same step (programming the start-time or end-time) is implemented.
Strategies Adopted after Transfer
The easy-hard group trained with the easy interface before switching to the hard interface.
However, the by-row strategies they used on easy(tr4) were completely dropped by hard(tr8); that is, they changed strategies when they switched to the hard interface. Indeed, on hard(tr8) (column three in Figure 6 ) the easy-hard group is statistically indistinguishable from the hardeasy group on hard(tr4) (column two in Figure 6 ), p > .10. The strategies adopted with the easy interface condition during training did not transfer to the hard interface.
In contrast, the group that transfers to the easy interface after experience using the hard interface [the hard(tr4)-easy(tr8) group] transfers the by-column strategies they acquiring during training. Comparing column one with column four in Figure 6 , we find that unlike the nonsignificant difference between hard(tr4) and hard(tr8) there is a significant difference in strategy use between easy(tr4) and easy(tr8) [F (1, 62) = 10.55, p = .002, MSE = 4.24].
Although on easy(tr8) subjects could program by-row without incurring an extra perceptualmotor cost, most of them did not. The paradox to be explained is why the entire group did not date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 switch to the intuitively simpler by-row strategy. Apparently, in transferring from a hard interface to an easy interface the methods acquired with the hard interface persisted. Just as apparently, in going from an easy to a hard interface, subjects quickly adapted to the hard interface.
Summary & Conclusions
Prior experience changes the nature of the functional task environment. Rather than being driven by local considerations of least-effort, prior experience brings in more global issues concerning what works well across the range of task environments that people use (Fu & Gray, 2004a ).
For the VCR study, the finding of asymmetric transfer seems surprising only from the perspective of an outside observer. From the perspective of subjects in the hard-easy condition, during the easy phase of the study (shows 5-8) the perceptual-motor cost of the by-column strategy greatly decreased and the memory cost stayed about the same. Hence, a strategy that worked well under the conditions of the hard task environment still worked and was easier to implement in the easy task environment.
In contrast, going from the easy to hard task environment greatly increased the perceptualmotor costs. Hence, during transfer, subjects in the easy-hard condition are motivated to reduce their workload. The expected utility calculations of soft constraints include not simply the local cost of a strategy, but also its success and failure in other task environments in which it has been applied. Another way of saying this is that the functional task environment includes not simply the physical task environment plus embodied cognition, but a significant component of prior experience.
date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46
The asymmetric transfer suggests an extension of the Bayesian Satisficing Model developed by Fu (Fu, 2003; Fu & Gray, 2004b) which shows that people adapt more quickly to changes in costs than to changes in benefit. Increasing the cost of a strategy increases the probability that people will search for a new one. Paradoxically but predictably, decreasing the cost of a strategy prematurely terminates the search for a more efficient strategy, resulting in stable, but suboptimal performance.
Costs without Benefits: Distinguishing between Cognitive versus Ecological Limits to Optimal Performance
In an influential paper, Norman and Bobrow (1975) pointed out that human performance could fail to achieve its goals due to either limits in the design of the task environment (designlimits) or limits in the available human resources (resource-limits). Whatever the available resources, performance could not exceed design-limits. 1 Simon warned us to be sure we consider the beach as well as the ant (Simon, 1996) when making inferences about human performance. This exhortation often is ignored by cognitive researchers who may interpret less than perfect performance in their paradigm as shedding light on cognitive theory. It also often is ignored by Human Factors professionals who may interpret less than perfect performance as indicating a training problem or the need for better compliance to standard operating procedures. 1 In the Zeitgeist of the times, Norman and Bobrow conducted their study within an information processing paradigm and spoke about their results in terms of "data-limits" and cognitive "resource-limits." However, their basic point extends to "design" limits as well as to limits on any aspects of embodied cognition. For example, in a recent study of errors that commercial airline pilots make when taxiing (i.e., the period between landing the plane and getting it to the right gate), Byrne and Kirlik (in press ) discovered that the strategies reported by their experts worked differentially well at different U.S. airports. Hence, getting lost while trying to find your gate can be attributed, in part, to the application of a strategy that works well at most airports, just not the airport in which you are currently located. Infinite amounts of training and exhortations to get pilots to perfectly execute strategies that work well at, say, Denver, will not reduce the error rate at, say, O'Hare.
In this section, I discuss work in which we ask two related questions, both of which ignore resource-limits to focus on design-limits. The first question asks "regardless of human limits, what is the optimal performance in this task environment?" (Neth, Sims, Veksler, & Gray, 2004) .
The second asks "regardless of the cost, if strategy X were consistently used, how successful would it be?" (Gray, Schoelles, & Myers, 2002) .
TRACS: An Optimality Analysis of the Task Environment
TRACS™ is a 'Tool for Research on Adaptive Cognitive Strategies' (Burns, 2004) . As shown on the upper-left of Figure 7 , TRACS has three shapes-triangle, circle, and square-with 8 cards per shape. Each shape has two types of cards -red and blue -and each card has two sides.
The distribution of card types per shape varies; triangles start with 6 red and 2 blue; circles with 4 and 4, and squares with 2 red and 6 blue. player's task is to pick the card, left or right, that is most likely to match the color of the center card. Burns (2002) makes the counterintuitive claim that TRACS players exhibited a baseline bias. One game of TRACS consists of 11 turns. Over the course of these turns the proportion of red and blue cards played out varies. However, rather than picking cards based on the proportion of reds and blues remaining in each shape, players picked cards based on the baseline distribution of red and blue cards. This failure to update in a dynamic card game struck us as a potentially interesting phenomenon, especially since it ran contrary to the well-known bias of baserate neglect (e.g., see, Gluck & Bower, 1988) .
Playing many games of TRACS confirmed our inability to perform better than baseline.
However, it also raised a suspicion that perhaps updating our memories for cards played did not benefit our performance. A detailed task analyses of TRACS (Neth et al., 2004 ) confirmed our suspicion. We followed up the task analysis with a simulation of 10,000 TRACS games played by each of four very different players. The Random player always selected the left or right card at random. The Baseline player always based the choices on the baseline distribution of red and blue cards in a shape. The Update player carefully updated its distribution of red and blue cards per shape as they were played. It based each choice on the number of red and blue cards remaining in each shape. Finally, the Omniscient player could see through the backs of the cards. were about equal at 6.57 and 6.79 respectively. The two tenths of a point difference between Baseline and Update would be easily lost in the variance of real human performance.
In Neth et al. (2004) we provide a detailed task analysis of Straight TRACS, a fuller discussion of the simulation, and a detailed explanation of the results. We also report on a new version, TRACS*, that was designed so that the difference between a perfect Baseline and a perfect Update agent would be 8.22 versus 10.83. An experiment performed using TRACS* shows that on their first game humans averaged a score of 8.8, but by their 10 th game they averaged 9.7. This improvement is significant. With experience in the task environment, humans perform better than the optimal Baseline agent but poorer than the optimal Update agent. To avoid drawing false inferences about the limits of boundedly rational cognition, we must be sure that performance is resource-limited, not design-limited.
Computational cognitive models in-search-of ecologically optimal strategies
Argus (Schoelles & Gray, 2001a , 2001b ) requires participants to classify the threat value of multiple targets in a radar-like monitoring task. Having an effective target acquisition strategy for selecting the next target to classify is a key component of effective performance.
The Border and Scan strategies were two search strategies that struck us as reasonable, but for which we found inconsistent use by subjects. For maximum performance, each target needs to be correctly classified before it leaves one sector and enters another (see Figure 8) . A Border strategy would always select the target that was closest to the border. In contrast, for the Scan strategy people pick one of the four radar sectors and methodically process targets from right-toleft (or vice versa). This strategy requires subjects to keep track of their current sector and, minimally, something about the spatial location of the last target checked.
Of the two, the Border strategy was our personal favorite, as it seemed to be the most efficient. We postulated that powerful bottom-up or stimulus-driven factors (such as configural properties of the visual displays) distracted subjects from the consistent application of this strategy. We believed that performance would be better if subjects ignored these distracters and consistently applied the Border strategy.
To test the effectiveness of the consistent application of both strategies (Gray et al., 2002) , we took one computational cognitive model (Schoelles, 2002) and, holding all else constant, swapped in and out three strategies for target acquisition. In addition to the Border and Scan strategy we implemented a Random strategy that would always pick its target at random from the 18 on the screen. Using each of these three strategies, we then ran the model many times on each strategy.
The original study varied two interface factors and one model factor. Although these details are very interesting, they varied the size of the difference between strategies but not their rankorder. (Consequently, details of these strategies are not discussed here. Interested readers are referred to the original paper, Gray et al., 2002) . Across all interface and model factors, on the classification task the Scan strategy was consistently the best (71%), followed by the Random strategy (63%), with the Border strategy producing the worst performance (50%).
How do these findings relate to our stated theme of using computational cognitive models to determine a set of ecologically optimal strategies for the Argus task? First, we were surprised by how poorly the pure Border strategy did. The Border strategy was one of our personal favorites and one that we believed that our humans were simply not implementing correctly or consistently. Apparently hunting for the target that is just about ready to cross a border consumes time that could be better used elsewhere. In any case, the data are now in; even implemented date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 correctly and consistently, the Border strategy is simply not an ecologically optimal model for the Argus Prime task.
Second, we were even more surprised to see how well the Random strategy did. We initially included the Random strategy thinking that it would provide a baseline of performance and reveal how bad our human subjects would be if they did not adopt a systematic Target Acquisition strategy but simply selected targets at random. However, because we intended the Random strategy as a baseline, we did not put as much thought as we should have into its cognitive plausibility. The heart of the Random strategy is a piece of software code that picks one target at random from among all the targets currently on the screen. We are reasonably sure that (most of) our human subjects do not have an implanted random number generator. Although we know of no studies that have compared a truly random search strategy with a human attempt at a random search strategy, it is the case that humans are generally bad at attempts to generate random sequences (Towse & Neil, 1998) . Hence, despite its high level of ecological optimality across interface conditions, we believe that a true Random strategy is one that humans are incapable of implementing.
Third, the relatively unsophisticated but systematic Scan strategy ranked higher than the Border strategy and the Random strategy in all interface conditions.
Summary of Costs without Benefits
It is obvious that even an agent with infinite resources could not perform better than the optimal allowed by the design of the task environment. In two different studies, we have investigated explanations that attributed lower than expected performance to limits of the agent.
In cases such as TRACS, optimal performance of a strategy can be evaluated without considering human limits of cognition, perception, and action. For TRACS we concluded that date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 even an ideal agent would not benefit from a memory update strategy. The limit to performance was built into the design of the task environment and was not an issue for cognitive analysis.
For Argus Prime, we implemented two search strategies in a cognitively plausible manner.
We had believed that one strategy, the Border strategy, was optimal and wondered at the failure of our subjects to consistently implement this strategy. We had postulated that our failure to find consistent use of the Border strategy reflected the operation of powerful bottom-up or stimulusdriven factors (such as configural properties of the visual displays) that distracted subjects from the consistent application of the optimal strategy. Our a priori beliefs have been forced to yield to hard data. In the Argus Prime simulated task environment the Border strategy is not particularly good. Indeed, it is beaten by both the Scan strategy and the Random strategy. As the developers of Argus Prime we are truly chagrined to admit our long-held belief that the Border strategy was the optimal strategy.
Summary of the Studies
As Simon (1992) said, to define optimal performance we must analyze the structure of the task environment along with the goals of the user. The work reported here suggests that ignoring the analysis of optimality may lead us to draw false conclusions about people's willingness or success at implementing different strategies in a given task environment.
The TRACS study used a cognitively implausible ideal agent to demonstrate that there was no benefit to implementing an effortful memory update strategy. Half of the soft constraints question is about benefit and the other half is about costs. However, asking about costs without first asking about benefit is clearly a fruitless endeavor.
In the study comparing Border versus Scan strategies for target acquisition we implemented two cognitively plausible strategies, but we ran them without considering soft constraints. That date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 is, we forced the model to use a fixed strategy under circumstance in which an adaptive agent would not have. This research strategy allowed us to assess the benefits as well as the costs of such strategies to our human subjects.
The study on the paradox of the active user drew our attention to the multiple task environments in which human performance takes place. Our investigation of transfer from an easy to a hard interface condition showed that differences in the costs of interaction across two varieties of a task environment produced asymmetrical differences in strategy transfer. Strategies adopted for a low-cost task environment were dropped when the costs of maintaining these strategies was increased. In contrast, strategies adopted in a high-cost task environment were transferred to a lower cost task environment. This transfer occurred even though the transferred by-column strategy was higher cost in the new task environment than the unused by-row strategy. This finding emphasizes the fact that soft constraints encompass a strategy's history of success and failures (i.e., its benefit), not simply its current cost.
When the benefits are about equal, the Soft Constraints framework suggests that different compositions of activities may be recruited based on considerations of local costs. We found this to be true in the dynamic decision-making study. In that study, different lockout costs led to the adoption of either an interaction-intensive or memory-intensive strategy. Likewise, we interpreted the results of the VCR study as reflecting a least-effort competition between alternative implementations of the same step. Within each of three conditions, Gray-Box, Free-Access, and Memory-Test, the same step could be accomplished by retrieving knowledge from in-the-world or in-the-head. The pattern of results suggested that subjects at least sometimes ignored perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 the-head. This pattern was explained as the influence of soft constraints in selecting the leasteffort basic activities in the functional task environment.
Conclusions
Advances in our study of embodied cognition have led to the realization that properties of functional cognition and of the world are in a tight loop. Properties of our cognitive, perceptual, and action systems determine how much and what aspects of the world we perceive; whereas properties of the world determine the mixture of cognitive, perceptual, and action operations required for us to perceive it. If we and our world form an integrated system, then an ecological analyses of our task environment cannot be separated from an analysis of functional cognition.
Indeed, rather than speaking of task environments in general, we need to distinguish between physical and functional task environments. The physical task environment consists of objects that can be interacted with by the human perceptual-motor system. The functional task environment encompasses both more and less than the physical task environment. First, the functional task environment only incorporates those physical features with which the embodied cognitive system interacts. Second, the methods for interaction are shaped by soft constraints.
Third, cognitive resources such as long-term memory, working memory, and attention form an integral part of the functional task environment.
The more naïve view of the tradeoffs between knowledge in-the-head versus in-the-world views the task environment as providing an external memory that can be used to reduce the amount of in-the-head processing we need to do to get by. Recasting the physical task environment as a functional task environment results in viewing the mixture of in-the-head versus in-the-world resources as not fixed, but fluid. The Soft Constraints approach shows how the mixture of external versus internal resources is driven by the non-deliberate calculation of date last saved: 2007-01-11 9:46 benefits and costs. Understanding the resources that the cognitive controller can obtain from the task environment should be the bases of ecological analyses. Understanding the costs of retrieving and processing information and how these costs are realized in-the-head or driven by changes in the task environment should be the bases of cognitive analyses. Rapprochement of ecological and cognitive analyses is not simply an interesting new direction, it is vital for the continuing progress of our science. (Schweickert, Fisher, & Proctor, 2003 (tr8) easy (tr4) hard (tr4) hard (tr8) easy ( . The top right half shows the target's attributes and the radio buttons used for entering the estimated threat value of the target on a 1-7 scale. The black dot in radio button #3
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